Could This Be The 18.5 Minute Gap?

Students of the Watergate scandal know that among the tapes of conversations by President Nixon with, well, virtually everybody, there was an 18 and a half minute gap in one particularly crucial tape: A conversation between Nixon and his aide H. R. Haldeman on June 20, 1972, three days after the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate building.

The missing snippet of conversation may have been about actions related to covering up White House involvement in the affair. Without the tapes, and without the information on those tapes, it may not have been possible to prove Nixon’s, or his aides’ involvement in the scandal. Those tapes, the eighteen-and-a-half minute gap and other evidence all contributed to Nixon’s downfall. At the time, many considered the blank tape to be direct evidence of Nixon’s attempt to cover up his or his aides’ involvement in the scandal.

In the Landis case, some data which is known to exist and is required to prove a doping violation hasn’t been turned over to the Landis defense team. That is the raw data from the carbon isotope ratio tests that “prove” (according to LNDD) that synthetic testosterone was present in Floyd Landis’ system during Stage 17 of the Tour.

TBV, with assistance from Duckstrap, provide an excellent run-down of the reasons the data is necessary and a number of likely scenarios. Where things get a bit complicated is whether or not anything LNDD or USADA might produce at this point would have any credibility.

The scenarios that TBV/Duckstrap envision are:

1. USADA produces the data files, and they show LNDD did the right thing, leaving us with the previous set of arguments.
2. USADA produces the data files, and they show LNDD didn’t do the right thing, invalidating the results.
3. USADA doesn’t produce the files claiming they are not relevant. This is problematic, because WADA technical document TD2003IDCR requires the data to make the positive claim.
4. USADA doesn’t produce the files, claiming they don’t exist. This could be because of a “document retention policy” in force at the LNDD.

But there’s a catch. As can be seen in the latest Arnie Baker Slide Show (also analyzed by TBV), LNDD has admitted in the Landaluce case that they are willing to break the rules when they consider it expedient to do so. Going through Baker’s slide show, we can also see that LNDD has, at times, made changes to the records in non-standard manners. In at least one instance, using white-out, and at least another by incorrectly “correcting” the data by marking the data out and writing the “proper” value without any indication of when the correction was made or who made it.

Credibility of the data is important. No credibility, no case. So, how credible might the raw data from the CIR/IRMS tests be if it appears at this point? My guess is that a number of people would be suspicious if the data magically confirmed that the lab had conducted the tests properly and truly isolated the compounds they claim to have found. We now know LNDD is willing to break the rules, would they go as far as faking their data? Could the data be faked so well that no one would detect it? It seems a big stretch, but given the stakes of the case, nothing is impossible.

In the second scenario that TBV and Duckstrap envision, the evidence would back up Landis’ arguments, and probably contribute greatly to a Landis victory. This would be good for Team Landis, as it would help them in the campaign to restore Floyd’s image, and would certainly be grounds for claiming he’d been exonerated. For the Landis side, this scenario is the best-case outcome, just as (assuming the data were credible) the first scenario is their worst-case outcome.

The third scenario, if USADA refuses to provide the information claiming it isn’t relevant, should cause the case to be thrown out, as WADA’s rules require this data in order to prove that only the substances of interest were isolated. Without that proof, according to WADA’s rules, there is no case because USADA and the lab can’t show that the data is reliable.

But if the data comes up missing (as in the last scenario), what then? Again, the case ought to be tossed out, for the same reason as in the third scenario.

But in either the third or fourth scenarios, would the average person consider Landis’ victory one of substance or technicality? My own guess is that it would be seen by a large number of people as a win based on a technicality, and my hunch is that many of the mainstream media stories would focus more on the technicality aspect of the victory than on the substance.

That would be a sad turn of events, because once the whole case is done and the final judgment rendered, the mainstream media owe it to their readers to really examine, in depth, the very nature of the anti-doping system and whether it is run in a fair and effective manner. In fact, given the hysteria over doping cases whenever a new scandal erupts, they owe it to their readers to examine the system now.

And while a few intrepid reporters have done that (Michael Hiltzik of the L.A. Times being prominent among those who have, for his continued coverage of the Landis story), the vast majority of media outlets that cover doping cases either run wire stories, or merely parrot stories from other places. This is a huge disservice to the readers/viewers, as very little thoughtful analysis of the stories, the lessons to be learned, or each case’s impact on anti-doping efforts gets published.

And given how much gets written, and how frustrated people are over the whole doping “problem” in sports, it would be good for the public to be treated to a thorough analysis of whether doping is as large a problem as we’re led to believe, whether the anti-doping efforts are punishing the guilty, or whether the anti-doping system is just punishing anyone and everyone who has the misfortune of falling into their clutches — regardless of guilt or innocence.

But going back to the data, it’s incumbent on USADA and LNDD to provide the data in order to establish whether or not the lab’s claims of a positive doping test are correct. They can’t just hide the data and hope that the case will go away. And if they can’t — or won’t — produce the data, then the arbitration panel should do the right thing and throw out the case on the grounds that the lab has not sufficiently proved their claims of a positive test. To do otherwise will show the world that anti-doping cases aren’t about following and enforcing the rules, they’re about punishing the unfortunate souls accused of doping by our current witchfinder generals.

Judging Floyd, a T(B)V series, Part III

For those of you who haven’t seen it yet, the latest installment in the Judging Floyd series is out at Trust But Verify. In this latest edition, the Hon. William Hue and David Brower go into the mechanics of the hearing process, who can participate, how arbitrators evaluate evidence presented by each side, the matter of controlling law, what form a decision must take, as well as appeals of the panel’s decision. As I’ve said before, the Judging Floyd series should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in the Landis case, and in anti-doping cases in general.