Less is More?

Sometimes, less really is more/better. But is that so when it comes to the number of anti-doping tests performed on athletes? Can we, by reducing the number of tests performed, actually do a better job of discouraging cyclists or other athletes from cheating?

Or, by reducing the number of tests, will more be able to avoid detection? Christian Prudhomme recently said that he is now in favor of targeted testing, rather than random testing. On Tuesday, CyclingNews.com reported:

Prudhomme no longer believes in the high number of doping controls during the Tour de France, but rather a more targeted approach on suspect riders. “Last year, I went to the Tour of Romandie for the announcement of 160 controls during the Tour de France,” he recalled of the pact signed with UCI president Pat McQuaid and the then AIGCP (International Association of Professional Cycling Teams) president Patrick Lefévère.

The disastrous experience of the 2007 Tour de France, with the positive tests of Alexander Vinokourov, Cristian Moreni and the exclusion of Michael Rasmussen, has changed his mind. “Now, I believe in targets,” he said.

This is exactly what the AFLD wants to do before and during the Tour de France. “Our priority is to be efficient,” said AFLD president Pierre Bordry, who had a constructive meeting with the UCI on May 14 and insisted that his agency works independently from ASO.

“We have the support of WADA and of the association of the national anti-doping agencies,” Bordry added. “We count on them to give us the necessary information for our targets.”

Odd that Prudhomme cites those examples as reasons to be in favor of targeted testing. While each of those individuals was likely on the UCI’s list of targeted riders, in the case of Vinokourov and Moreni, it was you standard, everyday, luck-of-the-draw anti-doping test that was responsible for catching them. (Notice that neither Sinkewitz, who tested positive from a sample taken before the Tour, nor Kaschechkin, who tested positive after his team was booted from the race, was mentioned?)

The last version of the UCI’s list that I saw (for 2006) had something like 300 names on it, and was a virtual roll call of all the big name riders in the ProTour, along with some Pro Continental riders thrown in for good measure. But here’s the ugly secret behind such lists and targeted testing — if all you do is go after those people, then anyone else who’s not on the list can pretty well dope with impunity. It will only be by accident that those other people get caught.

So what really happens? In each race, a few people get tested. Some “randomly” and some based on how they finished and perhaps even some who have been targeted.

Targeted testing is fine, as part of a greater program. If the vampires have gotten credible information that a certain rider is doping, targeting that rider makes a certain amount of sense. After all, that’s one way to either catch him/her in the act, or to determine that the person giving up the information wasn’t telling the truth.

Targeted testing is not fine if it’s the whole program. Why? Well for a few reasons. One, the only people you’ll catch are the ones you’re testing. Pretty obvious, eh?

Two, if you’re trying to strike fear into the hearts of riders, and to make them believe that they will eventually get caught, then this undercuts the credibility of that implied threat. Not much in the way of deterrence. “Yeah, right they’re gonna catch me,” I can hear some determined doper say, “they’re too distracted going after the big names to even be looking in my direction.” In effect, making targeted testing the whole game gives a large number of potential cheaters a twisted incentive to cheat. Just don’t dope so much that you draw attention to yourself, and you’ll be fine.

Now, with targeted testing, if you’ve got solid evidence (like a snitch you can believe in) go for it. But a real potential exists for riders/athletes being targeted for other reasons. Do something to piss off the powers that be, and you could find yourself on the wrong end of a doping test — for, like, ever.

The thing is, each test has a rate of false positives. No test is perfect. By targeting individuals, you actually raise the possibility that a person caught might be caught by a false positive. Assume, for a moment, that the rate of false positives for a give test is one in one hundred. If you test a given person 100 times, there’s a good chance one result will come up positive. You could spin that as finally catching the cheater, but did you really? Or was it just a false positive that conveniently fits expectations?

“Ah, but wait a minute,” I hear some people saying, “Marion Jones was tested many times and never came up positive.” Well, yes, that’s true. And Jones did eventually admit to having doped, so presumably some tests should have come back positive. Again, true, depending on the circumstances. Yes, if she’d been tested less, then the likelihood that she would have been caught would have been less.

Those were slightly different times, however. Back when she was beating tests, it was in part because she had people helping her beat those tests. Her program was designed to avoid positive results, using knowledge of how the testing system worked.

She may have been targeted, but were the tests truly random? My guess, probably not. Because truly random testing means you never know when the vampires will show up. (There are some rules that supposedly prevent the testers from showing up late at night or too early in the morning — everyone has to get some sleep sometime.) In Jones’ case, real random testing might have caught her.

For random testing to work, the athletes must never really know whether or when they will be tested. That’s the element of surprise needed to catch some folks in the act. So it’s important to know when athletes dope and with what methods. Victor Conte says that he advised USADA to step up testing during the fourth quarter, which coincides with track and field’s off season, as that’s when athletes will be doing the bulk of their doping. At the end of 2007, USADA’s testing numbers actually dropped (budget problems, perhaps?). Kind of makes you wonder who may have gotten away, doesn’t it?

For random testing to be really effective you need to ensure that everyone is going to get tested, and tested more than once during the year. For that, you need more tests, not less. So in the Tour de France (to use one example) that means stepping up the number of tests each day, in order to assure that everyone is tested. And, it means organizing the testing in such a way that you can ensure that every rider will eventually get an “invitation” to fill a cup. (TBV has a good outline as to how to do this, here.)

It’s not perfect, because some may still get away with doping. But targeting only a select group of individuals is far from perfect, either, especially if no other athletes are tested. That virtually guarantees that other athletes will get away with it.

But perhaps the organizers don’t really care. If some no-name domestique gets popped for doping, it’s not going to cause the race much embarrassment. The story will flare up for a day or so, the team will swear up and down that this was something the rider did on his own, and the story will go away. I’d give something like that a week, tops. Most likely, that story would play in the mainstream media for a day or so. Only the cycling press would stick with it longer — but probably only a bit longer.

When a big-name tests positive, then all hell breaks loose. Witness the Landis saga, which began almost two years ago. Or Operacion Puerto, which caused more than a few to be withdrawn from the 2006 Tour before they’d flung their legs over their saddles and pedaled on down the road. Or Vino, or Rasmussen, or even Sinkewitz, Jaksche and Kashechkin. That’s the kind of publicity that gives people like Christian Prudhomme ulcers.

Targeted testing addresses the big names, and gives them a disincentive to dope — during the Tour, at least — but it really doesn’t do anything to address the overall problem. What it does do is address the problem of negative publicity for the sponsors and the organizers. Ensuring that the big names are clean ensures that there are no nasty surprises for the sponsors, and no ugly stories plastered on the front pages of newspapers around the world. It doesn’t do anything to deter lesser athletes. Quite the opposite, in fact.

It appears, then, that in this case, less testing is more about the race’s reputation than it is about fair competition.

But Wait … There’s More!

Turns out that for those who might be unlucky enough to test positive during the Tour that there’s something else to worry about. Those fines that the ASO is imposing for a positive result (€100K/$155K) will be assessed after the rider’s A sample comes back positive, not after the B sample. From another CyclingNews.com story (emphasis mine):

In order to protect the image of the race, organiser ASO included a set of rules to follow in the case of an emerging doping affair. “If a rider tests positive during the Tour, or if a positive test prior to the Tour is made public during the event, and if there is a verified complicity of the team staff, the team will be asked to leave the Tour and to pay a fine of 100,000 Euro. To me, that is completely legitimate,” said Boyer. “In the event of a positive doping case where the rider acted on his own, there will be no fine and the team will be allowed to stay. If there is a legal dispute, the Chambre arbitrale du Sport (the Arbitration Chamber of France’s National Olympic Committee – ed.] will rule on the case within 24 hours. Its decision will be binding for both the organiser and the team.”

Because of the long time span between the analysis of an ‘A’ and ‘B’ sample, the anti-doping clauses will take effect already after a positive ‘A’ test. “For the sake of precaution and to protect the image of the race, it has been agreed that the testing of the ‘B’ sample will not be waited for,” Boyer explained.

As a precaution to protect the image of the race, they’re going to impose the fines after the A sample comes back, rather than wait for confirmation. What happens if the B sample results don’t match the A sample results? Will the fine be returned to the rider/team? Will they apologize to that rider, saying (in effect), “my bad”? Will they offer the rider any compensation for the harm done to his reputation or career? Color me skeptical.

Let’s back up to the first paragraph. Interesting wording. If the team is involved, they will be asked to leave the race. If it’s just the individual rider who’s at fault, he’ll get tossed from the race (and presumably stuck with the whole fine). What do you bet that if there is a positive result during the Tour, it turns out to be a rider who “acted on his own”? Notice that in addressing the possibility of a dispute, it’s discussed as involving the teams and the organizers. The riders aren’t mentioned here, at all. What if there’s a dispute between the rider and the organizers? Or between the rider and his team? Would the arbitration tribunal hear those disputes, too?

Parting Shot

Looks like Justin Gatlin’s appeal to the CAS is pretty much of a wash. Gatlin wasn’t able to get his ban reduced, so he’s not going to be able to compete in Beijing. In fact, he won’t be able to compete again until July 25th, 2010 — assuming he wants to stage a comeback at that point. The IAAF got smacked down a bit, too, as the panel denied their request to extend Gatlin’s ban to eight years. But the panel threw them a bone by resetting the date that Gatlin’s ban starts. The original panel had set the start date in May 2006. The CAS reset the date as July 25th, 2006. So Gatlin gets a couple of extra months tacked on that he didn’t have before. To be kind, the panel decided that each side should pay their own expenses. It’s pretty much of a wash, however, I suspect that neither side is very happy with the result.