Mayo Analysis

If you’re a regular reader of this blog, no doubt you’ve already heard about the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s decision in the case of Iban Mayo. A CAS panel issued a ruling suspending the Spanish cyclist from competition for two years, based on a positive test for EPO during the 2007 Tour de France. Mayo’s suspension will expire at the end of July 2009, meaning that if he does resume his cycling career, it will be 2010 at the very earliest before he can participate in the Super Bowl of cycling. (Assuming the ASO lets Mayo’s team compete with the Spaniard in the mix.)

When the CAS issued their decision earlier today, they posted the panel’s written opinion in French. Over at Trust But Verify, you can read a machine translation of the today’s ruling. I’ve only had a chance to glance through the document (it’s 33 pages in the original PDF version). Nevertheless, I’ve found a few interesting tidbits.

I’ve been under the impression that with the urine EPO test that WADA requires a separate lab to do the confirmation tests (a/k/a the B sample). Reading through the panel’s ruling, I find that either I’m under the wrong impression, or that the actual practice of EPO testing is conducted differently than WADA’s requirements. It turns out that for each test run on Mayo’s sample, the data resulting from that test was forwarded on to a different laboratory to double-check the analysis and interpretation.

The tests conducted at LNDD were verified by the WADA lab in Lausanne, Switzerland. The lab in Ghent, Belgium, where the original B sample analysis was performed, forwarded their results to the Australian Anti-Doping lab in Sydney. And this is where things begin to get interesting. Mayo’s A sample was declared to be a positive test result, triggering the B sample testing.

But when the Ghent lab tested Mayo’s B sample, their results were inconclusive. The lab in Sydney concurred, adding that they suggested doing further tests on the B sample — if enough of the B sample existed to do such testing. From the panel’s write-up, it’s not clear who the Sydney lab thought should do that additional testing.

The big bone of contention between the UCI and Mayo/RFEC (the Spanish Cycling Federation) was whether or not the additional B sample testing should be allowed. Due to the results reported by the Ghent lab, the RFEC and Mayo both believe that should be the end of the road. The UCI disagreed. And now, the CAS has backed up the UCI on that point. Further testing is allowed.

This establishes an interesting precedent. And, as you learn from an interview I’ll be publishing soon (I hope), there is such a thing as precedent in the CAS system. Even if we’ve been told otherwise. The precedent this case establishes is that — as long as the testing lab believes they have enough of a sample to work with, they can re-do the B sample tests as much as they like. Further, B samples can be shipped to different labs to conduct that work, if necessary. (If I understood the ruling correctly, the Ghent lab didn’t believe they could do the additional testing on the small amount of Mayo’s B sample that remained. They suggested that maybe LNDD could do that testing, instead.)

On the surface, as the panel writes the decision, it appears pretty logical. Sometimes tests get messed up and need to be re-run. The WADA rules, the panel says, allows for such testing. And in Mayo’s case, they believe that the inconclusive nature of the Ghent results allows for the additional work. Mayo tried to argue that he owned the samples and that he refused to allow the additional testing. That argument got slapped down, as did other arguments he and his side presented.

What’s also interesting about the case is the clear divergence of opinions and results. For both the A sample and B sample analyzed by LNDD, the Lausanne lab’s report on the data says that it is a clear indication of the use of EPO. In the Ghent testing, the Sydney lab’s opinion was that it was unclear and warranted further testing. To the CAS panel, the additional testing was within the “letter and spirit” of the UCI anti-doping regulations and the ISL.

Perhaps. But the precedent that’s been set is that a lab need only declare results inconclusive in order to keep testing, in the hopes of confirming their initial result. Sometimes that may be true. But it’s also a loophole that’s rife with the possibility of abuse. And, as has been noted recently, the more you test, the more likely it is that you’ll eventually get the result you want. If we’re going to allow multiple testing of the B sample by the anti-doping labs, shouldn’t the athletes also have a right to have the samples tested again and again. What if, in that circumstance, a contradictory result came up. Should the athlete then be acquitted of his/her doping violation?

What’s needed here is a set of clear, consistent and easy to understand rules. They should spell out under exactly what circumstances additional tests can be run on a B sample. If those circumstances aren’t met, no additional testing should be allowed. And if the labs have a right to retest, the rules should also address circumstances under which an athlete could demand further testing, as well.

Since this issue was the big bone of contention between the sides in the Mayo case, I think it’s fair to say that the rules on this issue were not crystal clear before today’s ruling was announced. In scanning the ruling, it appears to only address when an anti-doping lab can do additional testing. It will be quite a while (if ever) before any rules are established regarding whether an accused athlete can ask for further analysis of a B sample.

Interestingly, the panel started Mayo’s suspension from the day he was suspended (fired?) by Saunier Duval. Differing CAS panels can issue differing opinions on the same subject. Imagine if that standard had been applied to Floyd Landis. He’d just be returning to the pro peloton right about now, rather than having to sit out another five months. Nothing like consistency in at the “Supreme Court of Sport,” eh? Problem is, there’s no central tribunal that can correct contradictory CAS rulings. That’s a shame, because that is a serious weakness of the current system. But more on that when I finish writing up that interview I mentioned earlier. Which, I hope, will be within the next few days.