Arnie B. and The Whistleblower

If you haven’t seen it yet, Arnie Baker’s Slide Show 2.0, presented on November 17th in Tuscon, Arizona is available on Baker’s web site. It’s definitely an interesting read. And it includes some of the leaked documents from LNDD. Apparently, whoever sent the documents out (LNDD calls the person who did so a hacker, Baker calls the person a “whistleblower” — judging by the look of the documents, they appear pretty genuine to me) decided that Baker might be someone interested in the contents. But we’ll get to those in a bit. Before I dive in, let me preface this by saying this won’t be a slide-by-slide analysis, so I may inadvertently overlook some things.

First, the presentation, itself. In it, Baker presents more evidence of problematic documentation and sample identification in the lab documentation package. The items he points out are probably not the errors that LNDD admitted to earlier this week. Regular reader and comment writer Marc, in a second analysis of the Ferret documents and the lab package that he posted over at TBV, points out that a mistake like the one LNDD admits to occurs in a different part of the documentation. What Baker talks about, and what Marc pointed out, are discrepancies and changes to sample identification numbers within the Ferret documents. Baker also notes discrepancies in some other places within the lab package.

Baker also takes a look at lab testing standards, and compares what is available about the standards at the Australian anti-doping lab and the UCLA anti-doping lab with established WADA standards and protocols. From WADA’s own documentation, Baker shows that while lab test standards are supposed to be consistent from lab to lab, in practice the labs have differing standards for determining positive results when testing for testosterone and its metabolites.

In looking at the documentation Baker states that it is not possible, based on the lab’s own report, to determine whether the sample discussed in the report belongs to Floyd Landis. That’s because on the T/E results page he shows and quotes at that point, the athlete number written down is not Floyd’s number. The number reported on is 994 474, where Floyd’s is 995 474. But from Marc’s re-analysis of the documents, the page where this mistake occurs is not where LNDD admitted to making an error. That comes later in the package, and is noted, as LNDD claims.

Baker shows clear WADA rule violations in how corrections are made to the document. First, he talks about the rule (mistakes must be crossed out with a single line and then initialed), and then he shows instances where whiteout was used to cover mistakes. He talks about a questionable sample number, that many people read as 995 476, which is also not Floyd’s number. And he goes on to show that it is not difficult to keep track of identification numbers, using UPS and FedEx as examples of systems that do a good job of tracking identification numbers (that reminds me, I should check the progress of my Peets shipment).

Baker then turns his attention to whether the sample should have been tested in the first place. WADA has a clear rule about testestosterone testing and when a sample is to be considered contaminated. Simply put, when the amount of “free” testosterone or epitestosterone exceeds 5% the sample is to be considered contaminated and no further testing done. What was the amount of “free” epitestosterone in Landis’ sample, you might ask? Turns out the answer is: 7.7%. This comes straight from information the lab documentation package.

That’s a show-stopper right there. If the sample is contaminated, then everything from here on out is moot. The sample should not have been tested further and the results from the tests that were performed can’t be considered reliable. That’s WADA’s own rule. So this whole sordid mess should have ended right there.

But, of course, it didn’t. The story, unfortunately continues. Baker goes on in his discussion and talks about variations in test results within the samples. He produces data that shows extreme variation in the results of tests to determine the all-important T/E ration performed on the same urine sample. That variation, Baker says, also calls into question the accuracy of the results reported by the lab.

He then discusses the T/E Ratio and whether the current standard is an acceptable standard. In the notes to slide 19 of Baker’s presentation, he says:

In 2005, 25 out of 33 WADA-accredited labs reported their T/E ratio test results. A total of 955 T/E ratio tests results were between 4 and 6. Of those, just three tests were confirmed as doping positives.

A T/E screening value between 4 and 6 could be interpreted as a 99.5+% proof of innocence.

It is only when T/E ratios are above 15 that more tests than not are confirmed positive.

Unfortunately for Floyd, however, the current standard is 4:1. But Baker’s comments suggest that, if anything, the ratio should be raised back to at least 6:1 rather than the current standard. Heaven help us if it gets lowered more. The rate of false positives is likely to skyrocket.

Next, he turns his attention to the CIR/IRMS test and what constitutes a positive result. Baker, like Howard Jacobs, contends that the rules say all metabolites must be positive, and offers this quote from WADA’s own 2006 rules:

“Where an anabolic androgenic steroid is capable of being produced endogenously, a Sample will be deemed to contain such Prohibited Substance where the concentration of such Prohibited Substance or its metabolites or markers…in the Athlete’s Sample so deviates from the range of values normally found in humans that it is unlikely to be consistent with normal endogenous production.”

Much has been written about whether only one elevated metabolite on the CIR results is enough to declare a positive test. If Baker is quoting the 2006 World Anti-Doping Code accurately, then the answer is clear: All four metabolites must show a positive result. But what constitutes a positive result?

Baker makes the case that to be considered positive, the results must exceed the WADA standard plus the margin of uncertainty for the lab. At LNDD, the margin of uncertainty is 0.8. Given a WADA’s standard of 3.0, at LNDD for a result to be considered positive it must exceed 3.8. Only one of the metabolites in Landis’ results exceeds that value. Among the reasons Baker cites for requiring all metabolites to be positive is this:

…because the underlying scientific studies published in
the literature support that criteria.

And then Baker discusses how other labs would interpret Floyd’s results, based on the labs’ published standards. At UCLA and at the Australian lab, Floyd’s results would not have been considered positive, Baker states. And he goes on to say that although WADA seeks to ensure “harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and national level with respect to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping.” But if that were the case, then LNDD would not have reported a positive finding.

Unfortunately, LNDD has not provided any information about what their standards are for reporting positive results for CIR/IRMS tests.

Further on in the presentation, Baker discusses Floyd’s actual testosterone result and whether or not he had excess testosterone in his system. By the numbers, Floyd’s level (45.4) was less than one-quarter of the 200 ng/ml threshold that WADA considers to be suspicious. In other words: Floyd’s actual testosterone level was well within the normal range.

Based on the problems with the lab’s report, Baker believes that WADA should sanction LNDD. Among the problems he cites, besides what I’ve already outlined is that Floyd’s sample was not anonymous. It was clear from the TUE information who the rider being tested was. While Baker doesn’t make a huge deal out of this, he does say that changes need to be made to the process to ensure the credibility of the testing procedures.

The last portion of Baker’s presentation covered the Whistleblower documents. At the outset, Baker says he does not know whether or not the documents are genuine. He admits that if these documents are a fraud, his discussion of them will be meaningless.

There is one document that sticks out like a sore thumb amongst the ones Baker presents is this: A letter from LNDD to FINA, the International Swimming Federation, on July 4, 2006. The letter informs FINA that LNDD needs to retract an adverse analytical finding against an athlete, due to cross-contamination of the control urine sample with the sample being tested. LNDD asks FINA to destroy the original lab report. Take another look at this: LNDD is admitting it falsely accused an athlete of doping. At a time when the 2006 Tour de France was already under way.

Baker calls this an egregious error (hard to dispute that, if it’s true). And, he says, it’s a failure of the lab to, as required by WADA, “ensure the full reliability and accuracy of drug tests and the accurate reporting of results”. This should be grounds for the revocation of LNDD’s accreditation, Baker says.

But taken together, the Whistleblower documents paint a picture of a lab that makes a number of mistakes in the handling of data and in testing. If they’re genuine, LNDD should no longer be an accredited lab. Baker doesn’t make the claim that they are genuine documents, but suggests that it would be fairly easy for either LNDD (fat bloody chance) or the recipients to come forward and answer whether these are authentic documents. I doubt we’ll see that any time soon.

Much of what Baker talked about is information that has already been discussed, disected and chewed-over in other places. What he presents in this version of the slide show is information on the Whistleblower documents, along with analysis of the various WADA standards and whether or not they were followed in Floyd’s case. In addition, he clarifies more of Landis’ defense. I suspect, however, that there may be a few cards the Landis defense team is still keeping from view until the time is right to show their full hand.

All in all, Baker makes a very clear and convincing argument why Landis should be exonerated. Whether this will be enough to get Floyd back into the peloton remains to be seen. You can bet that when it comes time to slug it out, the other side is going to come out swinging.